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The “entropic brain hypothesis” holds that the quality of conscious states depends on the system’s
entropy (Carhart-Harris et al., 2014). Brain activity is said to become “more random and so harder
to predict in primary states – of which the psychedelic state is an exemplar.” Psychedelic-induced
brain activity would be associated with elevated entropy in some of its aspects with respect to
normal wakeful consciousness. This would indicate that psychedelic-induced brain activity would
exhibit criticality, while normal wakeful consciousness would be subcritical.
But can entropy be a unique indicator of the “quality of consciousness?” Are there reasons to
believe that psychedelic-induced activity is not critical?
ENTROPY
Complex systems such as the brain are neither completely regular nor completely random. Entropy
a measure of randomness, may then seem ill-qualified, per se, to account for brain activity. Indeed
to account for the complex blend of regularity and randomness, a wealth of so-called complexity
measures have been proposed (Crutchfield, 2012), some specifically for brain activity (Tononi
et al., 1994; Tognoli and Kelso, 2014). A single-scale indicator of randomness to describe the
consciousness spectrum simply boils down to a complexity measure depurated of its integration
or disequilibrium term.
Efforts to characterize brain states, and consciousness in particular, in terms of entropy of the
associated dynamics have a 20-year long history. For instance, a significant reduction in EEG
entropy (Pezard et al., 1996), and co-variation between entropy and mood improvement were
found in depressive patients (Thomasson et al., 2000). Furthermore, entropy monitoring is now
a standard method to evaluate the depth of anesthesia (Bein, 2006; Jordan et al., 2008; Olofsen
et al., 2008).
METASTABLE STATES AND METASTABILITY
A system is metastable when it spends an extended time in a configuration other than the system’s
least energy state (Kitzbichler et al., 2009; Allegrini et al., 2010; Tognoli and Kelso, 2014). Activity
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shows a dwell and escape dynamics: Within a metastable
state, physical quantities, e.g., energy, fluctuate reversibly
around a constant value, while the escape part of the
dynamics is associated with shifts from one metastable state to
another. Metastability is characterized in terms of dynamical
variables, e.g., avalanche size and duration, or inter-burst
intervals.
Carhart-Harris and colleagues define metastability as a
“measure of the variance in the network’s intrinsic synchrony”
(p. 10). However such a measure quantifies (the number of)
metastable states (Haldeman and Beggs, 2005; Shanahan, 2010),
rather than metastability, so that entropy, metastability, and
variance turn out to provide essentially the same information.
Carhart-Harris’ entropy is a configurational entropy, which
essentially counts the metastable states of the energy landscape.
A genuine configurational entropy establishes a connection
between the topography of the energy landscape and the
system’s dynamics. However, the coarse-graining level must
be drastic for one to claim that a few hundred time-points
(Carhart-Harris et al., 2012) sufficiently explore the brain’s
phase space, (how the number of metastable states scales with
coarse-graining level is also unknown). Thus, the associated
entropy cannot be considered a genuine configurational
entropy.
PSYCHEDELIC STATE AND CRITICALITY
Criticality of the psychedelic state is inferred through the
following reasoning: Criticality maximizes the amount of
metastable states (Haldeman and Beggs, 2005), and therefore
entropy; psychedelic states are associated with more metastable
states than normal wakefulness; therefore, the corresponding
state is critical, while normal wakefulness is subcritical
(Priesemann et al., 2014).
Even from a complexity view-point, some value of the
configuration entropy may well correspond to brain activity
patterns for which the system is critical. However, there are
reasons to doubt that psychedelic-associated activity is critical.
(1) Criticality implies (a set of) scaling variables, e.g., avalanche
size and duration. Nothing guarantees that the dynamics
producing these metastable states in Carhart-Harris et al. (2014)
would also generate a dynamics showing scaling as in Haldeman
and Beggs (2005). Furthermore, the few hundred timepoints in
Carhart-Harris’ data (Carhart-Harris et al., 2012) are insufficient
to show temporal scaling behavior. (2) While Carhart-Harris’
data show that the psychedelic state is associated with more
variance than normal wakefulness, other states could in principle
be associated with yet more variance than the one associated
with the psychedelic state. Furthermore, increasing variance
from a subcritical state doesn’t guarantee that the system will
become critical or that it will have a better power-law fit.
(3) Recent evidence shows that, unless parameters are fine-
tuned, cortical neural networks dynamics lies in a relatively
broad pseudo-critical region, where it is either subcritical
or supercritical, a state termed self-organized quasi-criticality
(Bonachela and Muñoz, 2010), or extended criticality (Longo
et al., 2012), corresponding to Griffiths phases (Moretti and
Muñoz, 2013). Accordingly, the “natural world” is presumably
not “more critical” than the brain, a notion that would be
inconsistent with a recently proposed mechanism of information
transfer in complex systems (West et al., 2008; Aquino et al.,
2011).
Furthermore, there is an essential contradiction in the
suggestion that primary consciousness would be a “psychological
atavism” and a “suboptimal mode” and, at the same time, “more
critical” than normal states (p. 12). On the one hand, intuitively,
the psychedelic state wouldn’t appear to be functionally optimal.
The hyper-connectivity which characterizes it (Tagliazucchi
et al., 2016) is in general associated brain pathology (Whitfield-
Gabrieli et al., 2009; Supekar et al., 2013; Hillary et al.,
2015). During the psychedelic state the number of forbidden
connectivity patterns may decrease, but some of these patterns
may be associated with suboptimal (possibly even functionally
detrimental) states. On the other hand, however, criticality
has been shown to be optimal in terms of transmission and
storage of information, computational capabilities, large network
stability and sensitivity to sensory stimuli (Shew et al., 2009;
Bonachela and Muñoz, 2010). In what sense can the brain
be at the same time critical and suboptimal? And if primary
consciousness is critical, and therefore in so many ways optimal,
what’s the evolutionary meaning of secondary states? A possible
understanding of criticality and optimality of the psychedelic
state is suggested by the results of Zare and Grigolini (2013)
suggest. In this study, genuine temporal complexity was found
to occur earlier than avalanche-size complexity, in a narrow
range where information transfer becomesmaximal. Interpreting
this information transport enhancement as a signature of
criticality, power law avalanches become a manifestation of
supercriticality. Accordingly, normal waking and the psychedelic
state may respectively lie in the critical and supercritical
regimes.
CONCLUSIONS
A true configurational entropy requires extensive phase space
exploration, otherwise it merely reflects the random side of
complexity. Under these conditions, quantifying the number
of metastable states is not enough, per se, to assess criticality.
Rather than just moving brain activity toward or away from
criticality, context-specific demands can modulate the scaling
properties of brain fluctuations (Popivanov et al., 2006; Bianco
et al., 2007; Buiatti et al., 2007; Bhattacharya, 2009; Zilber et al.,
2012), by modifying the scale at which they show scaling or
by inducing transitions between different scaling regimes or
cross-overs between universality classes (Papo, 2014).
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